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Competition and Privacy in Web 2.0 and the Cloud
Randal C. Picker*
We are once again changing how we use computers. In the past, we
moved from mainframes to mini computers to freestanding personal
computers. That was a powerful shift in control and organizational
structure. Mainframes were rare and were treated as such, tended to
with loving care and serviced by a small caste of computing priests.
PCs, in contrast, were everywhere: on every knowledge worker’s desk
and eventually in the family room of many homes. Full
decentralization. In the PC age, the computer desktop was the most
valuable real estate around, and, for most people, that meant
Microsoft Windows.
Microsoft Windows was—and is—both product and delivery
system. Product in the sense that Windows performed certain
functions that all operating systems perform. Windows tracks files,
sends data through ports for printing and tells your computer screen
how to display fonts and images. Basic stuff that we expect of our
operating systems. But Windows is more than that: Window delivers
software. Software delivery, especially before the Internet, was
difficult. A consumer might find the software pre-installed on a new
PC. Or the consumer might go to a computer store—remember
those?—and plunk down her credit card and walk out with a large,
almost empty box, that had, buried within it somewhere, a plastic
CD with new software.
But Microsoft could guarantee software delivery by just
incorporating the new software into Windows. With each new release
of Windows—as Windows moved down the development path from
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Windows 3.1 to Windows 95 to 98 and on towards Vista—
Microsoft expanded the footprint of Windows. This was not just a
question of more megabytes; Windows got bigger because it
expanded its functionality and in doing so killed off what had been
separate markets in freestanding functions. Including a product in the
next version of Windows insured its widespread distribution as each
version of Windows quickly expanded its market share.
In some basic sense, Windows was fundamentally unbounded.
That is, there was no obvious boundary for the scope of functions
that might be embraced in Windows.1 This mattered most when we
introduced ubiquitous networks to link computers together to create
the Internet and the Web. The move to networked devices created a
possible inflection point, a point of churn and competition as
different firms sought the upperhand in the new computing space. In
his May, 1995 Internet Tidal Wave memo, Bill Gates famously
feared that Netscape would “commoditize the underlying operating
system.”2 Windows was going to become plumbing, important to be
sure, but fundamentally anonymous and only noticed when it wasn’t
working right. Microsoft moved aggressively against Netscape and
relied heavily on its ability to bundle Internet Explorer with
Windows at no additional charge to defeat Netscape. Microsoft won
its battle against Netscape, though it did so in ways found to be
illegal by competition authorities in the United States.3

1 See Randal C. Picker, Pursuing a Remedy in Microsoft: The Declining Need for
Centralized Coordination in a Networked World, 158 J Institutional & Theoretical Econ 113
(2002); Randal C. Picker, Unbundling Scope-of-Permission Goods: When Should We Invest in
Reducing Entry Barriers?, 72 U Chi L Rev 189 (2005).
2

Bill Gates, The Internet Tidal Wave,
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/exhibits/20.pdf).

May

26,

1995

(online

at

3 United States v Microsoft Corp., 253 F3d 34, 58 (DC Cir 2001) (en banc). The

European Union also found that Microsoft had abused its dominant position in operating
systems, though the focus of the EU case was on interoperability with servers and the
bundling of Windows Media Player with Windows. See Microsoft Corp. v Commission of the
European Communities, Case T-201/04, Court of First Instance.
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But Microsoft seems to be losing the larger war suggested by the
tidal wave. We are in the midst of two large related shifts in our
computing platform. The first shift, which often travels under the
name Web 2.0, is fundamentally about what we use computers to do.
We have moved from creating documents in Microsoft Office to
living life online: searching on Google, buying and selling on eBay,
hanging out with our friends on mySpace and Facebook, watching
the newest viral video on YouTube. The second shift, often called
cloud computing, is more about a change in the organization of the
fundamental processes of computing—computation and storage—
with some overlap with the Web 2.0 shift. Instead of storing my
email on my laptop, I will just outsource storage and store it with
Google. I won’t have an email product resident on my computer;
instead, Google will provide an email service through a Web browser.
These shifts have one key point in common: the possibility of
creating prodigious amounts of data about end users. The new web
intermediaries at the heart of Web 2.0 have access to an enormous
datastream about their users. Google can learn a great deal about my
interests with every search that I run. Facebook learns about me as I
build my profile and link to my friends. Imagine how much a cloud
storage provider might learn about me if the provider could read all
of my stored email and documents. These data are the lifeblood of
Web 2.0 and could play a similarly important role as a cloud
infrastructure emerges. The advertising that supports much of the
content on the Internet is more valuable if it can be matched to my
actual interests, and the flexibility of the web in delivering content
means that web advertising is increasingly tailored advertising, or socalled behavioral advertising.
How we choose to regulate these datastreams is the central
regulatory issue of the emerging computer infrastructure. Our choices
here obviously have privacy consequences but also for how much
competition will emerge. These are tightly linked. We have
frequently regulated how intermediaries can use the information that
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passes through their hands. Banks, cable companies, phone
companies—even you local video store—face strong restrictions on
how they can use the information seen by them as they process many
of our transactions. Law disables them from using that information.
In contrast, the emerging financial infrastructure for financing Web
2.0—free content paid for by online advertising supported by rich
databases—is largely unregulated. To be sure, we have to assess
whether the privacy issues are different in the online space, but we
also need consider how different regulation of this transactional
information implicates competition.
The current Web 2.0 market is dominated by Google. And like
Windows, Google’s infrastructure has no obvious boundaries. Indeed,
the Google engine is in many ways more powerful than Microsoft’s.
It isn’t obvious how the size of Windows or how its functionality
effected the price that Microsoft could charge for Windows. When
Microsoft added browser functionality to Windows, it didn’t
necessarily increase the price of Windows. In contrast, Google’s
“price” scales up directly with each added service that it finances
through advertising. Google’s expansion model results in additional
revenue with each ad that is clicked. Like Windows, Google’s
business has no obvious boundaries. The limit seems to be the
content or services that can be supported by advertising and might be
as large as anything mediated by a display screen, but, unlike
Windows, Google’s revenue scales as more services are added.
I. Finding Data or Throwing It Away?
We should start with desktop computing before the emergence of the
Internet. Microsoft Office—Excel, Outlook, PowerPoint and
Word—set the standard for desktop productivity tools. These were
the tools that we used to create documents that resided on the hard
disks in our desktops or laptops. Outlook was used to manage
calendar, contacts and email. The CPUs in our computers churned
away to do the calculations in an Excel spreadsheet or to format a
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document in Word. These documents were then distributed, on
paper or via email, to be read by the recipients.
Now think about what you use your computer for today. In this
new era, we might think of matching and coordination as being the
defining tasks we expect software to perform. eBay is explicitly about
creating a marketplace to match buyers and sellers. Craigslist matches
everything under the sun: buyers and sellers to be sure and job seekers
galore, but also personals and house swaps, lost and found items and
rideshares. Social networking sites like mySpace and Facebook match
individuals to define new groups. And Google matches people
looking for content with the websites where that content is stored.
This is the emergence of a new class of online intermediaries.
They typically operate over the Internet through a Web browser.
They can charge transaction fees like eBay or charge for a job posting
like Craigslist. Given the number of pageviews that take place, the
intermediary can support all of the content with advertising as
Google does. Given the ready ability to match advertising with
content, a platform that generates pageviews is a valuable media
property.
But there is more. The intermediary has the ability to see what is
happening with every click and this creates an incredibly rich
clickstream.4 eBay may be able to figure out whether I am more of a
Cubs fan than a White Sox fan and how much I like Pokémon.
Google has an even deeper knowledge of my interests, as I search far
more often than I buy or sell on eBay. This datastream arises
organically as part of the services that that website performs. We can
choose to limit the use or disclosure of this information, but we
almost have to engineer throwing away the information. It would
otherwise emerge naturally from the role played by the intermediary.

4 John Battelle, The Search (Portfolio, 2005).
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The emergence of these Web intermediaries is one of the defining
aspects of Web 2.0.5 The idea of cloud computing is related but a
little different. Computing power was highly centralized with
mainframes, and then we decentralized through minicomputers and
PCs. With the cloud, content and computing power will increasingly
be managed centrally.6 The problem with owning a PC is that you
are your own tech support and most of us are getting lousy service.
Computers are complicated. Badly-run computers inflect harm on all
of us, when their power is harvested in botnets and computer spam is
sent across the globe. And PCs are lumpy: you buy computing power
at one time and not just when you need it.
It doesn’t have to work that way. Most people wouldn’t consider
for a second rolling their own electricity; they expect to get it from a
socket and want to rely on the local electricity company to do the
hard work that lies behind that. We may be headed that direction on
computing power, both for calculation and storage. Some content
may be stored locally on your machine, while other content—content
that you in some powerful sense think belongs to you—will be stored
remotely. Where actually? You won’t have a clue.
Most people probably don’t have strong feelings about where
their computer calculations are done. Whether most of the processing
power exists locally in the device on your desktop or in your hand is a
detail. If communications costs have dropped sufficiently such that
we won’t notice when most of the computing is done remotely and
then delivered rapidly to our local devices, we can return computing
power to the center. This is really just an engineering problem that
turns on the relative cost of central and local processing power and of
distant and local—really local meaning on the bus inside your

5 See Tim O’Reilly, What is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the

Next
Generation
of
Software
(online
http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/oreilly/tim/news/2005/09/30/what-is-web-20.html).

at

6 Nicholas Carr, The Big Switch: Rewiring the World, From Edison to Google (Norton,

2008).
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computer—communication. Important, to be sure, but not
something most end-users will care about.
But that analysis is crucially dependent on an implicit
assumption, namely, that changing the location of processing or
storage doesn’t change anything about how the datastream associated
with processing or storage is used. Think of this as a version of cloud
neutrality: where processing or storage is done should be irrelevant—
neutral—for outcomes, legal or otherwise. If instead my cloud
provider monitored all of my spreadsheet calculations and then
tailored advertising to match what it had gleaned from the
calculations—“Looks like he’s looking for a mortgage”—that would
be a big change. The move to centralized processing and storage
creates communications traffic that can be monitored.
Email is a good example. I have a separate email application
(Microsoft Outlook) that I use to download email messages and store
those on my laptop. I also have an email account through Google
(Gmail) which I manage through a web browser. That email is stored
remotely with Google and Google dutifully notifies me of how much
of “my” storage space at Google that I have filled up. I paid cash for
Outlook—more exactly, the University of Chicago has a site license
with Microsoft—but I “pay” for Gmail by being exposed to the
advertisements that it places on the far right edge of the screen.
Google runs my email through a filter to determine which ads I
should see.
How we use the rich datastreams that have emerged under Web
2.0 and that may emerge under cloud computing is a point of design,
both technical design and legal design. Nothing about the change in
the organization of computing need bring with it a change in
information revelation. We could choose to limit how these new
datastreams are used, as we have often done in the past with new
datastreams. And we could have downloadable products supported by
advertising, though, to be sure, to maximize the value of the
advertising, the product would need to go online periodically to
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communicate information about me back to the mothership and to
download new ads based on my locally-stored email. Of course,
usually if that happens, we call the software spyware, that is, software
that sits locally on a computer with the mission of secretly collecting
and reporting back information.
II. Designing Stickiness and Data Portability
The question is what happens to the datastream flowing through the
chokepoint? How is that information used and controlled? How does
that effect both privacy and competition? Take an early Web 2.0
example, eBay. eBay creates stickiness with its user reputation and
feedback scores. eBay mediates transactions between strangers. As a
purchaser, how can I determine whether my prospective seller will
deliver the listed item? Transactions between strangers at a distance is
a long-standing problem in commercial law. eBay users build up a
reputation score transaction by transaction and that reputation is the
key way in which eBay mitigates the problem of transactions at a
distance between strangers.
But the eBay reputation system also has important competitive
consequences. Since the reputation accumulates prior transactions, a
competing auctions entrant starts with an immediate disadvantage.
eBay’s reputation system is sticky, or, put differently, it creates
switching costs. A long-time seller on eBay has a reputation that she
has built up carefully. But if she switches to the entrant, she will be a
newbie again and buyers will naturally be reluctant to transact with
her. But there is a ready solution: make the eBay identity and
reputation portable. If I am a good seller on eBay as
HotDVDBuysNow, I should be just as good on another site.
The consequences of stickiness through user ratings and identities
is not lost on eBay’s competitors. They understand the way in which
those scores creates entry barrier for auction competitors. Take the
case of ReverseAuction.com. eBay’s original business relied on
ascending price auctions. Users would bid against each other for a
fixed period of time, and at the end of the auction, the high bid won.
6/18/2008

Page 8

Picker

Competition and Privacy in Web 2.0 and the Cloud

ReverseAuction entered with a declining-price auction website. Sellers
offered items for sale, and the offered price declined until a buyer
jumped in to buy at the current price. Once that happened, the
auction was over.
ReverseAuction understood the competitive disadvantage it faced
against eBay. To solve that, at least according to the eventual
complaint filed by the Federal Trade Commission,7 ReverseAuction
registered as an eBay user and agreed to the eBay user agreement.
ReverseAuction then harvested information from eBay’s website by
acquiring eBay user IDs, email addresses and feedback ratings.
ReverseAuction then sent an email to eBay’s users suggesting that
they could reserve their eBay identities at ReverseAuction and that
they should do quickly lest they lose that opportunity.
The FTC found much troubling in RevereAuction’s actions but
there was a recognition of the way in which eBay’s control over user
reputations—the accumulated results of many transactions—blocked
competition in online auctions. The critical point is that
portability—or the absence thereof—is a design point. eBay’s user
agreement bars users from “importing or exporting feedback
information off of the Sites or for using it for purposes unrelated to
eBay.”8 eBay understandably wants to lock-in its users and hopes to
do that by restricting the extent to which the valuable eBay-based
reputations can be used elsewhere. Reputation and feedback ratings
are a tool which allows the auction house to make past transactions
relevant today. For law, the question is whether we should limit user
agreements that block reputation portability, whether that portability
is sought by users directly or by competitors.
Consider another example of portability. I use RSS—Real Simple
Syndication—to manage lots of the information that flows through

7 Case documents for Federal Trade Commission v ReverseAuction.com, Inc. are online at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/reverseauction/index.shtm.
8 http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/user-agreement.html.
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my computer and I use Google Reader to manage that content. If you
want to know what I am interested in right now, you want to look at
my Google Reader tag cloud. But the right question for law is: as we
move from products and local storage to services and centralized
storage, who owns the data and what establishes rights to access and
use the data? Suppose, for example, that I wanted to drop Google
Reader and switch to another tool for managing RSS, say
FeedDemon. I can obviously just starting running FeedDemon, but
would I have to re-type or re-link to the feeds to get them into
FeedDemon? And what of my tagged items? I don’t know how to tell
how many items I have in Google Reader with tags, but I suspect that
the relevant order of magnitude is in the 1000s.
The answer on the feeds is OPML. Yes, I have no idea what that
is either (actually, OPML is the Outline Processor Markup
Language), and it is used precisely to create an XML file that should
be readable by another RSS program. This isn’t as easy as switching
from Diet Pepsi to Diet Coke—the contrary choice is
inconceivable—but, assuming that your RSS reader supports
importing and exporting OPML, it is doable. But moving the list of
feeds over is just one small piece of my information. The detailed
matching of news stories and tags represents a much greater share of
the value. I don’t see any particularly easy way to export that
information into another RSS program.
We can count on competitors to help lower these switching costs.
We saw that above with ReverseAuction. In another classic case,9
Borland did this when it sold the spreadsheet Quattro Pro with an
alternative interface that emulated that of Lotus 1-2-3, the dominant
spreadsheet of the day. Lotus tried to rely on copyright law to defeat
Borland and failed though do remember that the vote in the Supreme
Court was 4-4 and ties go to the lower court winner, in this case
Borland. When I switched my main browsing program from Internet
9 Lotus Development Corp. v Borland International, Inc., 49 F3d 807 (1st Cir 1995), aff’d
by an equally divided court, 516 US 233 (1996)
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Explorer to Firefox, Firefox looked on my hard disk to find the links
that I had stored as IE Favorites, again reducing the transaction costs
of switching.
But we see how design matters when we return to my tagged
stories. I don’t know for sure, but I don’t think much if any of my
Google Reader info is stored locally on my machine. I don’t think
that there is any locally-stored info for FeedDemon to examine were I
trying to switch over both my feeds list and my tagged stories. And
the question is whether FeedDemon could write something that
would burrow through my Google Reader “subscription”—that
seems like a fair description—to extract my tagged stories.
As the Lotus/Borland saga makes clear, law matters for switching
costs and portability. Sometimes that law will be copyright law as it
was there. Other times it will be antitrust, as the European Union is
trying now in forcing Microsoft to disclose more so as to increase
interoperability between operating systems and servers. In other cases,
we will legislate portability and interoperability, as we have done with
telephone number portability10 and as parts of Europe may push
Apple on iTunes and the iPod.
III. Controlling How Data Are Used
We should return to Google and consider how Google might use the
datastreams that arise in search. Search is an exercise in relevance: for
any search term presented, the search engine wants to return the
“best” matches. How should we assess best? Brin and Page’s original
search patent is for their PageRank algorithm. That algorithm looks
to the link structure of the web to measure importance and therefore
relevance.11 If we are looking for information about the Chicago
Cubs, if many pages link to a particular page about the Cubs, we
might conclude that that is a particularly relevant page. The
10 http://ftp.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Factsheets/portable.html.
11 For a basic description, see Our Search: Google Technology (online at
http://www.google.com/technology/).
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PageRank approach emphasizes information that is available publicly.
Any entrant could do the same, at least if they could do so consistent
with the original patent.
That version of search doesn’t rely on the datastreams that arise in
search. But we might imagine an approach which does so and which
relies more directly on collective intelligence. Focus on how searchers
respond to the presented search results. If searchers routinely reject
the first listed item for the second, we would be learning something
about the perceived relevance of the results. That approach,
multiplied over many users and an almost infinite number of
searches, would create a system that learns and evolves in response to
what users are doing.12 If that learning improved relevance, more
searchers would seek to rely on the system, and that in turn would
generate more learning. This is a positive feedback loop and should
operate as a barrier to entry. Unlike the page-link information at the
heart of PageRank which relies on publicly observable data, learning
through search results relies on private information available only to
the search engine.
These are very different approaches to the use of the datastreams
available to Google and that is just in framing how relevance is
assessed, the core function of search. The datastream could also be
used to match the ads presented next to the organic search results
with the searcher, so-called behavioral advertising. John Wanamaker,
the department store magnate, famously observed that he wasted half
of the money that he spent on advertising, but “I don’t know which
half.”13 And Wanamaker may have been optimistic. Think about TV
advertising and how many ads that you see for products that you
never consume. Those ads are almost all wasted. Behavioral

12 See Hal Varian, Why data matters, Mar 4,
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/03/why-data-matters.html).

2008

(online

at

13 See John Wanamaker (1838-1922), The Advertising Century (online at
http://adage.com/century/people006.html).
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advertising offers the promise of tailoring ads to individual consumers
greatly increasing the efficiency of each ad dollar spent.
In the past, we have placed extensive controls on how
intermediaries can use the information that flows through their
hands. For example, the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
added privacy protections for consumers.14 The current version of
that statute requires written or electronic consent of cable customers
before the cable operator can use the cable system to collect
personally identifiable information about its customers. But the
statute also creates an exception to that rule allowing collection of
such information to detect cable theft and, more generally, “to obtain
information necessary to render a cable service or other service
provided by the cable operator to the subscriber.”15 Whether
collecting information to implement behavioral advertising will
qualify under this safe harbor is an open question. The cable statute
also bars disclosure of personally identifiable information to third
parties, though, again, the statue exempts disclosures “necessary to
render, or conduct a legitimate business activity related to, a cable
service or other service provided by the cable operator to the
subscriber.”16
How we implement privacy restrictions matters enormously and
indeed the limits can have perverse consequences. For example, a
disclosure limit of the sort seen in the cable statute artificially pushes
towards vertical integration. As most disclosure limits don’t prevent
disclosure within a particular firm but only bar disclosure across firm
boundaries, a firm will have an artificial incentive to expand the size
and scope of the firm so as to use the information fully. Vertical
integration renders the disclosure limit ineffective. We might see

14 PL 98-549, codified at 47 USC 551.
15 47 USC 551(b)(2)(A).
16 47 USC 551(c)(2)(A).
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mergers that would otherwise be unattractive as a way to end-run the
across-firm disclosure limits.
Note also that disclosure may not be the act of relevance here. If
Google runs an ad placement service—of course it does: AdSense17—
it need not disclose any information to facilitate matches between
content and consumers. For Google’s customers—its advertisers—the
information will be in a black box. These customers will be able to
evaluate the click-through rates that they are seeing from the use of
the information controlled by Google, but they need never see the
information itself. No disclosure, just use on their behalf. Indeed, as
suggested before, Google would almost certainly prefer not to disclose
the information, since disclosing the information gives up the control
that Google has from its exclusive access to the information.
IV. Conclusion
With Web 2.0, we have once again changed how we use computers.
That change has brought with it new intermediaries who sit at the
crossroads of the matching and coordination that define how we use
the Internet today. Those intermediaries—Google first and
foremost—have access to extraordinarily detailed information about
their customers. That information arises naturally from the very
services provided. We will see a similar pattern as cloud computing
becomes more important, and cloud service providers will also have
available to them a rich datastream that arises from their customer’s
activities.
To date, these intermediaries have faced few limitations in how
they use the information that they see. That information can be used
to improve their core businesses—adding collective intelligence to
search to increase relevance—and to finance—through advertising
backed by rich databases that allows ads to be matched to individual
customers—virtually any content or service that can be provided

17 https://www.google.com/adsense/login/en_US/.
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through a screen. To focus on Google as the largest player in this
space, there is no obvious limit to its scale and an advertisingsupported business adds revenue with each additional screen that is
viewed.
In the past, we have regulated intermediaries at these
transactional bottlenecks—banks, cable companies, phone companies
and the like—and limited the ways in which they can use the
information that they see. Presumably the same forces that animated
those rules—fundamental concerns about customer privacy—need to
be assessed for our new information intermediaries. In doing that, we
need to be acutely aware of how our choices influence competition.
An uneven playing field—allowing one firm to use the information
that it sees while blocking others from doing the same thing—creates
market power through limiting competition. We rarely want to do
that. And privacy rules that limit how information can be used and
shared across firms will artificially push towards greater consolidation,
something which again usually works against maintaining robust
competition.
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